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HIV: FEAR OF AIDS OR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE?
RICHARD J. HUNTER, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1981, an extremely rare cancer, Kaposi's sarcoma,
emerged as a disease striking young gay men in New York, Los Angeles,
and San Francisco.' The disease was named AIDS in 1982.2 HIV, or the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus, causes AIDS, or the Acquired Immuno-
deficiency Syndrome.3 Tests for HIV infection indicate whether or not the
human body has produced antibodies to the virus. 4 By 1991, a two-step
testing process was in place.5 If the result from the first test, the Enzyme
Immunoassay (EIA) test, was negative, the individual was not considered to
have been infected. 6 If the result of the EIA test was positive, the test was
* Richard J. Hunter, Jr. is a Professor of Legal Studies at the Stillman School of Business,
Seton Hall University, and is an Adjunct Professor for the Health Law and Policy Program, Seton
Hall University School of Law.
1. Theresa McGovern & Raymond A. Smith, AIDS, Case Definition, at http://www.thebody.
comencyclo/aids.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
2. So Little Time ... An AIDS History, at http://www.aegis.com/topics/timeline (last visited
Jan. 23, 2003). For a comprehensive view of legal issues in HIV/AIDS, see generally DAVID W.
WEBBER, AIDS AND THE LAW (3d ed. 1997).
3. See What is AIDS & HIV?, at http://www.aidsmeds.com/lessons/StartHere3.htm (last
visited Feb 3, 2005) (explaining AIDS is not a disease in and of itself, but the final stage in the
progression of an illness, characterized by a complete failure of the immune system). When the
immune system breaks down, a person may develop many serious, often deadly, infections and
cancers. Id. The infections are often called opportunistic infections. Id. There is an "official" list
of opportunistic infections, sometimes collectively referred to as "AIDS Wasting Syndrome,"
compiled by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). See McGovern & Smith, supra note 1. The
most common include PCP (Pneumocystis pneumonia), a lung infection; KS (Kaposi's sarcoma),
a skin cancer; CMV (Cytomegalovirus), an infection that usually affects the eyes; and Candida, a
fungal infection in the mouth, throat, or vagina. Id. An individual will develop AIDS only after
being infected with HIV. Id. An infected person will typically not manifest symptoms for an
average of five to seven years after infection. Id. The definition of AIDS is itself quite con-
troversial, often involving a mixture of politics and medicine. See id. For a "case definition" of
AIDS, a set of criteria used by public health agencies in the surveillance or monitoring of disease
syndromes, see McGovern & Smith, supra note 1, and What is AIDS & HIV?.
4. A positive test means that antibodies to the disease have been detected. BBC Health, Ask
the Doctor-HIV, AIDS, and Antibodies, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/health/askdoctor/hiv.aids-
antibodies.shtml (last visited Feb. 5, 2004). Anti-HIV antibodies can be detected because when
the HIV virus enters the body, the immune system is stimulated to produce antibodies to fight the
invasion. Id.
5. See Am I Infected?, at http://www.aidsmeds.com/lessons/HIVtests3.htm (last visited Feb.
3, 2005).
6. Id. The EIA test is also known as the Enzyme Linked ImmunoSorbent Assay or "ELISA"
test. R.F. v. Abbott Labs., 745 A.2d 1174, 1177 (N.J. 2000).
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to be re-administered. 7 If there was a second positive result, the blood
sample was to be retested using the Western Blot test.8 If both the EIA and
Western Blot tests were positive, the patient was deemed to have HIV.9
The interval between exposure to HIV and the presence of antibodies in the
blood was known to vary from two weeks to a year or more. 10
Can a doctor who misreads an HIV test, telling a patient that it is
positive, be held liable for emotional damages caused by the misdiagnosisll
and subsequent advice? What would be the extent of these damages? Two
cases from New Jersey, Williamson v. Waldman,12 and Doe v. Arts, 13 im-
pact the answers to these questions.
II. THE COMMON LAW TORT OF NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
At the outset, it is important to note that the cause of action for the
negligent infliction of emotional distress' 4 in HIV cases involves an
7. Am I Infected?, supra note 5.
8. Id.
9. See id. In 1993, the CDC expanded the criteria for a diagnosis of AIDS in adults and
adolescents to include CD4+ T-cell count at or below 200 cells per microliter in the presence of
HIC infection. McGovern & Smith, supra note 1. In persons age five and older with a normally
functioning immune system, CD4+ T-cell counts usually range from 500-1,500 cells per
microliter. Id.
10. See Abbott Labs., 745 A.2d at 1177. HIV, the blood-borne pathogen, is transmitted
primarily "(1) between sex partners through contact of blood with anal or genital mucosa; (2) by
direct inoculation of infected blood or blood-containing tissues through transfusion....
transplantation .... [orl reuse of contaminated needles.., and (3) from a mother with HIV
infection to her newborn during pregnancy, delivery, or breast feeding." WEBBER, supra note 2,
at 14.
I1. See Ellen L. Luepke, Note, HIV Misdiagnosis: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
and the False-Positive, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1229, 1229 (1996) (stating that "[biecause AIDS is a
terminal illness, and because modem American culture still stigmatizes HIV-positive and AIDS-
inflicted individuals as unclean or dangerous, any positive diagnosis, including a false-positive
HIV test result, can be an emotionally taxing experience").
12. 696 A.2d 14 (N.J. 1997).
13. 823 A.2d 855 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
14. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 54, 363 (5th ed. 1984)
for an explanation of the courts' general adoption of the "impact rule," limiting recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress to those cases where a plaintiff could prove the defen-
dant's conduct caused a physical impact or injury to the plaintiff's person. A court relying on the
impact rule reasoned that a plaintiff who suffered from some ascertainable physical injury or
impact would also experience "fright and nervousness" at the time of the injury. Id. Subse-
quently, most jurisdictions began to require that mental anguish be supported by a physical
manifestation. See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 181 (Mass. 1982) (requiring physical
harm to be "manifested by objective symptomatology and substantiated by expert medical
testimony"). Accord Wyatt v. Gilmore, 290 S.E.2d 790, 792 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982); Towns v.
Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Colo. 1978); Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148,
155 (Me. 1979) ("objective symptomatology" requirement); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Young, 384
So. 2d 69, 71 (Miss. 1980) ("genuine physical consequences" requirement); Corso v. Merrill, 406
A.2d 300, 303 (N.H. 1979) ("objective medical determination" standard, through the use of expert
[VOL. 80:385
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application of traditional tort concepts of duty, breach, and causation. 15 In
order to establish liability, the plaintiff must prove that the "defendant's
conduct was negligent and proximately caused plaintiff's injuries."16
Determining whether or not a defendant is negligent "depends on whether
defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, which is analyzed in terms of
foreseeability."17 In addition, the emotional injury must be both "genuine
and substantial."' 8 The principle of causation, based on the reasonable fore-
seeability of substantial emotional distress, may be analogized to that found
in exposure to asbestos,19 diethylstilbestrol (DES),20 carcinogens, 21 and
other "toxic tort" cases.2
2
medical testimony). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 436, 436A (1965). The
physical manifestation rule may be demonstrated through direct testimony by the plaintiff about
experiencing "crying fits," general nervousness, anxiety, stress, loss of sleep, fear, etc. E.g.,
Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431,433 (Tenn. 1982); Figlar v. Gordon, 53 A.2d
645, 648 (Conn. 1947). Expert testimony may be elicited from a psychologist or a psychiatrist.
E.g., Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Ky. 1984) (allowing a Ph.D. in psychology to testify
about the legitimacy of plaintiff's emotional and psychological trauma over fear of future illness
after she sustained brain, head, and nose injuries, and that the plaintiff's anxiety and depression
would intensify with time). The testimony of a minister or a counselor may also give credence to
a plaintiff's claim of emotional distress. Clark v. Taylor, 710 F.2d 4, 14 (1st Cir. 1983). It is now
well-settled that "emotional injury may be as debilitating as physical harm. It is no less deserving
of redress." Molien v. Kaiser Found., 616 P.2d 813, 814 (Cal. 1980). See also Richard J. Hunter,
Jr., Law and Psychology in Products Liability, 6 L. & PSYCHOL. BULL. 5, 5-6 (1995). Hunter
discusses Gnirk v. Ford Motor Co., where the court stated,
If plaintiff makes out a case for the jury on the issue [of a design defect], and if the
jury find for her on the issue she is entitled to recover damages for emotional distress
suffered during the event in which her son drowned, for the physical injury
proximately caused, and for any mental injury accompanying such emotional distress
and physical injury.
Id. (quoting Gnirk v. Ford Motor Co., 572 F. Supp. 1201, 1205 (D.S.D. 1983)). See also infra
notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
15. Caputzal v. The Lindsay Co., 222 A.2d 513, 515-16 (N.J. 1966).
16. Decker v. Princeton Packet, 561 A.2d 1122, 1128 (N.J. 1989). See also Jill Trachten-
berg, Living in Fear: Recovering Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Damages Based on
the Fear of Contracting AIDS, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 529, 536 (1999).
17. Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 377 (N.J. 1994). The court permitted damages for
emotional distress for an unmarried cohabitant who witnessed the death of a fianc6 after being
struck by a car. Id.
18. Id. at 378; see also Carey v. Lovett, 622 A.2d 1279, 1286 (N.J. 1993) (permitting a
mother's claim for emotional distress based on a doctor's misdiagnosis of a fetus because the
"physical and emotional ties between mother and fetus so unite them that a physician should anti-
cipate that any malpractice that adversely affects the fetus will cause emotional distress to the
mother"). In Castro v. New York Life Insurance Co., the court allowed a claim because it could be
tied to a distinct event, which would cause a reasonable person to develop a fear of contracting the
disease. Castro v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695, 698 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). The link or
connection between the event and the fear was referred to as the "genuineness of the claim." Id.
In Castro, the plaintiff brought a personal injury case, claiming that while she was working as a
cleaning person, she was jabbed in the thumb by a discarded syringe needle. Id. at 696. See also
Trachtenberg, supra note 16, at 536.
19. E.g., Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495, 495 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1985). See also Mauro v. Raymark Indus., 561 A.2d 257, 260-66 (N.J. 1989) (determining that a
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Several important common law principles exist recognizing a separate
cause of action for the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Ini-
tially, the common law permitted recovery for emotional distress only when
the plaintiff suffered a physical injury or impact that led to the emotional
distress. 23 Yet, even in those jurisdictions that required an injury or impact,
courts held that even the infliction of a very small amount of trauma would
justify recovery for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 24
In a majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue, the re-
quirement of a physical impact or injury has been discarded.25 In place of a
physical injury or impact standard, several states applied a "zone of danger"
test, allowing recovery where a plaintiff has been threatened with physical
injury by the conduct of the defendant and the plaintiff was in reasonable
fear of injury.26 Another refinement or variation on the zone of danger test
was found in the adoption of the "bystander test," under which a plaintiff
who witnessed the death or serious injury to a family member might be per-
mitted to recover, even though the plaintiff was not in the zone of physical
danger. 27 Several other states permitted recovery when the plaintiff's
plaintiff could recover damages for emotional distress based upon a reasonable concern that he or
she has an enhanced risk of contracting cancer as a result of an exposure to asbestos).
20. E.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 173 (Mass. 1982). DES was an experi-
mental drug administered to pregnant women to prevent miscarriages. Id. DES was identified as
a causative agent in the development of clear-cell adenocarcinoma, a rare and deadly cancer of the
reproductive organs of daughters of women treated with DES. Id.
21. See Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 816 (Cal. 1993) (setting out the
requirements for recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress in fear of cancer cases).
22. E.g., Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431, 433 (Tenn. 1982). The plain-
tiffs in Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co. alleged exposure to cancer-causing chemicals in their well-
water and sought damages for emotional distress for fear of an increased risk of leukemia and
other cancers. Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1228 (D. Mass. 1986). The
court held that the plaintiffs could recover "only for that degree of emotional distress which a
reasonable person normally would have experienced under [the] circumstances." Id. (citing
Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 181).
23. See generally, e.g., Howard v. Alexandria Hosp., 429 S.E.2d 22 (Va. 1993); Bodine v.
Fed. Kemper Life Assurance Co., 912 F.2d 1373 (11 th Cir. 1990).
24. E.g., Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky. 1980) (holding that plaintiffs expo-
sure to x-rays were sufficient physical contact to support a claim of emotional distress).
25. See infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Colorado Springs, 775 P.2d 51, 52 (Col. Ct. App. 1988) (deny-
ing recovery for emotional distress to plaintiffs who saw a family member's casket fall headlong
into a grave because they were not in the zone of danger), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 981 (1989).
27. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968) (holding that mother was able to
recover for emotional distress caused by her witnessing the death of her daughter even though
there was no physical impact and she was not in the zone of physical danger). The court outlined
factors which would indicate the degree and nature of a defendant's foreseeability:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one
who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emo-
tional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the
accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence.
[VOL. 80:385
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emotional injury was severe enough to manifest itself in a physical injury.
28
Several states have dispensed with applying any formal test and permit re-
covery for severe mental distress that is "reasonably foreseeable."
29 How
would these various common law alternatives impact on the development of
case law in New Jersey?
III. DOE V. ARTS
In 1990, John Doe, a thirty-three year old professional photographer,
moved in with his girlfriend, identified in court documents as S.P., whose
husband, P.P., had died a year earlier from AIDS-related complications.
3 0
Although S.P. did not have HIV and had consistently tested negative for the
virus, John Doe acceded to S.P.'s request that he be tested.
31 S.P. then set
up an appointment for John Doe with Dr. Paul Arts, her family doctor.
32
After speaking briefly with the plaintiff, Dr. Paul Arts conducted the test on
March 4, 1991.33 Several weeks later when the test results became avail-
able, Dr. Arts told S.P. on the telephone that Doe had tested positive.
3 4 In a
later telephone conversation, Dr. Arts told Doe directly that the test was
positive and that there was no possibility that the test results had been
(3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with the
absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship.
Id.
28. See, e.g., Stites v. Sundstrand Heat Transfer, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1516, 1526 (W.D. Mich.
1987) (requiring that, under Michigan law, a plaintiff seeking recovery for fear of cancer must
show that the emotional distress "has manifested itself in a definite and objective physical in-
jury"). For a discussion of the issue under Pennsylvania law, see generally Andrew M. Satriano,
A Cry for Compassion: Fear of AIDS in Pennsylvania, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 565 (2003).
29. See, e.g., In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1568 (D. Haw. 1990)
(limiting claims for the negligent infliction of emotional distress in Hawaii to actions that
foreseeably inflict serious emotional distress on a reasonable person); Dempsey v. Nat'l Enquirer,
702 F. Supp. 927, 930 (D. Me. 1988) (barring recovery against a tabloid publication because it
was not reasonably foreseeable that the publication would cause the plaintiff to suffer severe
emotional distress).




34. Id. Concerning the possible issue of the improper disclosure of plaintiffs test results, see
Keith J. Hilzendeger, Comment, Unreasonable Publicity: How Well Does Tort Law Protect the
Unwarranted Disclosure of a Person's H1V-Positive Status?, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 187 (2003). A
Wisconsin Court of Appeals found four elements in establishing the tort of public disclosure of
private facts:
(1) [A] public disclosure of facts regarding the plaintiff; (2) the facts disclosed must be
private facts; (3) the private matter made public must be one which would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities; and (4) the defendant must
act either unreasonably or recklessly as to whether there was a legitimate public
interest in the matter, or with actual knowledge that none existed.
Hillman v. Columbia County, 474 N.W.2d 913, 919-20 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
20041
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mistaken. 35 Dr. Arts was a board-certified family physician, practicing in
New Jersey. 36 He had cared for P.P. before his death.37 "However, Arts
was not a specialist in the treatment of AIDS or HIV and had treated only
two patients infected with HIV for 'routine medical matters."' 38 From 1990
to the time of the trial in 2001, Dr. Arts could not recall attending any
seminar or lecture on HIV or AIDS nor had he read or studied any text-
books or treatises on either HIV or AIDS.39 Dr. Arts was plainly not an
"expert" in the fields of either HIV or AIDS.40
Dr. Arts stated, however, that his general medical training gave him
sufficient expertise to counsel individuals about the significance of the HIV
test results. 41 Arts later testified that when he received the plaintiff's test
results, he was unable to definitively determine the significance of the two
part test.42 He did not "fully understand" the ramifications of the test re-
sults, and since the plaintiff had tested positive to one part and negative to
the other, he was not sure what the results of the testing meant.43 Arts
maintained that he had told S.P. that the plaintiff should go to the Infectious
Disease Clinic at the Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital in New
Brunswick for "further evaluation and consultation."44 Because Dr. Arts
did not consider the plaintiff to be his patient, he did not retain a copy of the
test results.45 Dr. Arts also had nothing in his medical records to indicate
how he had interpreted the test results, or what he had actually told S.P.
after reviewing the results.a6
As a result of the diagnosis, Doe underwent medical treatment.47
Personnel at the AIDS Clinical Trial Unit at Robert Wood Johnson took
plaintiff's medical history and administered tests but did not retest the
plaintiff for an HIV infection.48 The plaintiff was referred to Raritan Bay
Medical Center in Perth Amboy for further care and monitoring after he
was told that he did not qualify for any clinical drug trials at Robert Wood
35. Doe, 823 A.2d at 858.









45. Id. at 860.
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Johnson because his T-Cell level was too high.49 Plaintiff eventually went
to Raritan Bay's Treatment Assessment Program ("TAP") Clinic in Novem-
ber 1991, where he informed staff that he had been diagnosed as HIV-
positive.50 While TAP monitored his condition for two and one-half-years,
TAP never retested the plaintiff for an HIV infection.5'
After contemplating suicide and falling into deep depression, Doe also
began to see a mental health therapist in 1994.52 The therapist Jean Festa
became suspicious about the diagnosis and test results because Doe showed
no outward symptoms of the disease.5 3 Festa then reviewed the test results
and determined that Doe was not HIV-positive; a second test confirmed her
opinion. 54
Even after receiving the news that he was not in fact HIV-positive, Doe
continued to be severely depressed because of the "changes" that had taken
place in his life since he had been erroneously informed that he was HIV-
positive.55 He was taking psychotropic medications.5 6 He lost both his re-
lationship with S.P. and his photography business.57 He was unable to
maintain a steady job and could not afford to pay his income taxes. 5 8 At the
time of the trial, the plaintiff was serving a five-year sentence for pos-
session of a firearm for unlawful purposes, which the plaintiff insisted was
a direct result of his depression and poor mental health.59 Doe filed suit
against Dr. Arts, claiming medical malpractice. 60
The jury returned a verdict in the amount of $300,000 for Doe, finding
that Dr. Arts was one hundred percent liable for his emotional distress.
61
Dr. Arts filed an appeal based upon the New Jersey State Supreme Court's
decision in Williamson v. Waldman, in which the court had limited damages
for emotional distress to a six-month "window of anxiety" after a positive
exposure to HIV, the period within which a "reasonable and well-informed
person" could fear having contracted the disease. 62
49. Id.






56. Id.; see generally JERROLD S. MAXMEN ET AL., PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS: FAST FACTS
(2002) (summarizing details of individual medications).
57. Doe v. Arts, 823 A.2d 855, 860 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
58. Id.
59. Id. at n.3
60. Id. at 857.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 863.
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IV. WILLIAMSON V. WALDMAN
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Karen Williamson worked for her husband's commercial cleaning busi-
ness. 63 On June 6, 1991, Williamson was cleaning a medical office when
she was pricked by a used lancet that had been improperly discarded.64
Williamson was cleaning a trash can in the examining room of the offices
occupied by Doctors Leonard Waldman, Jeffrey Feldman, and Jacques
Losman. 65 The disposal of lancets and similar medical implements in com-
mon trash receptacles was expressly prohibited by state regulation in New
Jersey; such waste must be disposed of in appropriate medical-waste recep-
tacles and labeled accordingly. 66
After being pricked, Williamson went home for the night, stopping on
the way at her sister-in-law's home where she discussed the incident with
an acquaintance, who was a nurse. 67 As a result of that discussion,
Williamson became alarmed, especially with the potential of contracting
hepatitis or AIDS.68 While the plaintiff had been informed that she should
visit the emergency room immediately, Williamson instead chose to make
an appointment with her family physician, Dr. Jerome DeMasi.69
The plaintiff visited Dr. DeMasi four days after the incident.70  Dr.
DeMasi initially told the plaintiff that she would have to be tested for HIV
for a period of seven to ten years. 7 1 Dr. DeMasi later modified that period
to one or two years; however, the plaintiff was not informed of this change
until November 1994, more than three years later.72 Since the initial
incident, Williamson was tested for HIV several times: in July 1992, in
63. Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14, 16 (N.J. 1997).
64. Id. A lancet is a surgical knife that is used to prick fingers in order to acquire blood
samples. STEDMAN'S CONCISE MEDICAL DICTIONARY 551 (2d ed. 1994).
65. Id.
66. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7:26, §§ 3A.10-11, 3A.15 (2003) (regulating the segregation,
packaging, and marking of such waste); id. § 3A. 16 (offering general disposal requirements). The
violation of these disposal and labeling requirements may be considered negligence per se under a
traditional tort analysis in establishing a breach of the duty of reasonable or due care. See
generally id. §§ 3A.10-16. Negligence per se involves conduct, whether an act or an omission,
which is treated as negligence "without any argument or proof as to the particular surrounding
circumstances, either because it is a violation of a statute or valid municipal ordinance ......
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1187 (4th ed. 1951).
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July 1993, and in July 1994.73 Each test was negative for both HIV and
hepatitis.74 After the 1994 test, Dr. DeMasi told Williamson that her
chances of having contracted HIV from the finger prick were "slim and
remote."75
Williamson claimed that as a result of the incident, she had become
depressed and had suffered certain "lifestyle changes," including a decision
not to have another baby and not to engage in unprotected sex with her
husband James. 76 On May 19, 1993, Williamson filed suit against Doctors
Waldman, Losman, and Feldman, essentially alleging that the doctors were
liable for medical malpractice by breaching their duty to use reasonable
care in inspecting and making the premises under their care and custody
reasonably safe.77 This breach of duty resulted in Williamson suffering se-
vere personal injuries, physical and mental pain and anguish, loss of
enjoyment of life, loss of earning capacity, and the need for future medical
treatment and/or potential hospitalization. 78
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.79 The trial court
dismissed Williamson's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress,
finding that Williamson had failed to demonstrate that she had actually been






78. Id. at 17.
79. Id.
80. Id. The trial court relied on the objective standard imposed in the majority of juris-
dictions that have addressed the issue of the legal standard for determining proximate cause in
cases of emotional distress arising from a fear of contracting AIDS. E.g., K.A.C. v. Benson, 527
N.W.2d 553, 560 (Minn. 1995). Most of the courts that apply the objective standard require that
the plaintiff demonstrate actual exposure to the HIV virus as a condition for establishing proxi-
mate cause. E.g., Burk v. Sage Prods., 747 F. Supp. 285, 286 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (rejecting a claim
for negligent infliction of emotional distress because the plaintiff, a nurse pricked by a needle, was
unable to demonstrate that a needle had exposed her to HIV). In Marchica v. Long Island Rail-
road Co., the court used the term "physical impact." Marchica v. Long Island R.R. Co., 31 F.3d
1197, 1203 (2d Cir. 1994). Some courts have added a further requirement that the plaintiff prove
a "medically sound channel of transmission" of the HIV virus. Brown v. N.Y. City Health &
Hosp., 225 A.D.2d 36, 45 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (requiring that the plaintiff prove not only that
blood or fluid was in fact transferred from an HIV-positive person but also the existence of a
scientifically accepted method of the transmission of the virus); Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 154
Misc.2d 269, 274 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (denying recovery to a doctor who performed surgery on
an AIDS-infected patient in the absence of proof of a channel of transmission). But see Hartwig v.
Or. Trail Eye Clinic, 580 N.W.2d 86, 94-95 (Neb. 1998) (refusing to apply the actual exposure
requirement when the needle that pricked the plaintiff was unavailable for testing); S. Cent. Reg.
Med. Ctr. v. Pickering, 749 So.2d 95, 102 (Miss. 1999) (holding where the defendant allowed or
caused the "best evidence" to be destroyed, a rebuttable presumption of actual exposure would
arise in favor of the plaintiff). "Policy considerations" are frequently cited in support of an ob-
jective standard because in the absence of such requirements, "speculative, unreliable and
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:385
of contracting AIDS was "idiosyncratic."81 As a result, the trial court ruled
that the defendants' acts were not the proximate or legal cause of her emo-
tional distress. 82 The New Jersey Appellate Division reversed the decision
of the trial court, holding that the plaintiff was not required to demonstrate
actual exposure to HIV.83 The Appellate Division ruled that the plaintiff
could recover damages based on the reasonableness of her fears, essentially
a question for a jury, allowing the plaintiff to recover for emotional distress
without demonstrating either actual exposure to the HIV virus or a viable
channel of transmission of the virus. 84
Adopting a "foreseeable-risk standard," the Appellate Division cited
with approval Faya v. Almarez. 85 In Faya, two patients, who had been
operated on by an HIV-infected doctor, were able to recover damages for
emotional distress even though they could not prove actual exposure to or a
means of transmission of HIV because there was no evidence that the
doctor had cut himself or bled into the surgical area.86 The Faya court con-
cluded that the plaintiff could recover "for their fear of and its physical
manifestations which may have resulted from Almarez's [the physician's]
fraudulent claims could provide a flood of ill-justified litigation." Brown, 225 A.D.2d at 45. See
also Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14, 19 (N.J. 1997) (stating that one policy rationale of the
actual exposure requirement is to deter a flood of litigation). Also cited prominently is the need to
counteract "ignorance," "hysteria," "irrational fears," "prejudice," "stigmatization," and "dis-
crimination" directed against those inflicted with AIDS. Vance A. Fink, Jr., Comment, Emotional
Distress Damages for Fear of Contracting Aids: Should Plaintiffs Have to Show Exposure to
HIV?, 99 DICK. L. REV. 779, 802-03 (1995). The author cited a study that found that many
individuals, who were wholly ignorant about HIV and AIDS, believed that "HIV can be trans-
mitted through casual contact, such as kissing, sharing drinking glasses, using public lavatory
facilities, being coughed or sneezed on by an infected person, or through insect bites." Id. at 803.
A second study in 1999 found that forty-eight percent of respondents agreed with the statement
"PWAs [People With AIDS] are responsible for their illness," forty-one percent believed that they
could contract AIDS "from a public toilet," and roughly half believed that AIDS could be
transmitted by sharing a drinking glass with an infected person. Gregory M. Herek et al., HIV-
Related Stigma and Knowledge in the United States: Prevalence and Trends 1991-1999, 92 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH, 371, 374 (2002). Reverend Jerry Falwell termed AIDS a "gay plague." Mary
McGrory, The Spread of Fear, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1985, at A2. The objective standard has
been criticized because it does not address the need for, and the availability of, accurate
information about HIV/AIDS, and thus will not counteract such ignorance. Edward M. Slaughter,
AIDS Phobia: The Infliction of Emotional Distress and the Fear of AIDS, 16 U. HAW. L. REV.
143, 160 (1994). As to the issue of stigmatization of PWAs, see Herek, at 371, noting "[pleople
with AIDS and the social groups to which they belong have been stigmatized worldwide since the
epidemic began."
81. Williamson, 696 A.2d at 17. See also Alexander Santee, Note, More Than Just Bad
Blood: Reasonably Assessing Fear of AIDS Claims, 46 VILL. L. REV. 207, 210 (stating "[alt the
heart of the debate is whether a plaintiff must demonstrate actual exposure to HIV/AIDS or, more
simply, that his or her fear of contracting AIDS is reasonable considering the circumstances").
82. Williamson, 696 A.2d at 17.
83. Williamson v. Waldman, 677 A.2d 1179, 1180-81 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
84. Id.
85. 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).
86. Williamson, 696 A.2d at 19 (citing Faya, 329 A.2d at 337).
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alleged negligence for the period constituting their reasonable window of
anxiety-the period between when they learned of Almarez's illness and
received their HIV-negative results." 87 The New Jersey Appellate Division
concluded,
We know of no reason, given existing circumstances and the
realities of the times, as well as the policies that underlie tort law
doctrine in this state, to require as a prerequisite to recovery for
infliction of emotional distress that the plaintiff first establish ac-
tual exposure to the feared disease. The cause of action is "based
on a reasonable concern that [the claimant] has an enhanced risk
of... disease," and a claim for medical surveillance damages. 88
Considering the reasonableness of Williamson's fears, the New Jersey
Appellate Division found that "it cannot validly be said, as a matter of law,
in light of common knowledge, that a person who receives a puncture
wound from medical waste reacts unreasonably in suffering serious psychic
injury from contemplating the possibility of developing AIDS ... following
a series of negative test results ... ."89 Each defendant filed a petition for
certification. 90
B. THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT ENTERS THE DEBATE
The New Jersey Supreme Court framed the question on appeal as
follows:
The case requires the court to consider the standard for estab-
lishing causation for emotional distress attributable to the fear of
contracting AIDS through infection from the HIV virus. More
specifically, the issue posed is whether the standard of causation is
based on objective factors, such as the actual exposure to HIV
and/or the exposure to a viable means or channel of transmission
of HIV; or, in the alternative, whether it is sufficient to demon-
strate the reasonableness of the claimant's emotional distress over
the fear of contracting AIDS.91
In answering the question, the New Jersey Supreme Court carefully
weighed the conflicting policy arguments and held that a person claiming
damages for emotional distress based on the fear of contracting AIDS must
87. Faya, 620 A.2d at 337.
88. Williamson v. Waldman, 677 A.2d 1179, 1181 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (quoting
Mauro v. Raymark Indus., 561 A.2d 257, 261 (1989)).
89. Id.
90. Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14, 17 (N.J. 1997).
91. Id. at 16.
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demonstrate that the defendant's negligence proximately caused genuine
and substantial emotional distress of a type and character that would be
experienced by a reasonable person of ordinary experience who has a level
of knowledge that coincides with "then-current, accurate, and generally
available public information" about the causes and transmission of AIDS.92
This standard may be termed an "enhanced reasonableness standard,"
achieved by requiring a higher level of knowledge as a basis for recovery
for emotional distress based on the fear of contracting AIDS.93
The court concluded that damages for emotional distress must be based
on the fears of a reasonable and well-informed person and that damages for
emotional distress should be limited to a "window of anxiety," establishing
a period after which such a reasonable and well-informed person would no
longer experience continuing emotional distress. 94  In De Millo v.
Schrager,95 decided in 1995, the Superior Court defined the "window of
anxiety" as the period from the time of possible exposure to that point when
a plaintiff knows or should know that he or she was not infected with
HIV.96 Based upon a careful reading of available scientific, medical, and
legal literature, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the window
"appears to range from six months to a year after exposure." 97
The Williamson court noted that an application of the "window of
anxiety" test is especially complicated because the plaintiff had received in-
correct information from a health care professional, Dr. Jerome DeMasi. 98
That circumstance had extended plaintiff's emotional distress beyond what
92. Id. at 21.
93. Id. The court concluded that the establishment of an "enhanced reasonableness standard"
through a requirement of a higher level of knowledge would help address the policy questions
raised in the Fink article, serving to discourage "hysteria as well as prejudice and discrimination
against people living with HIV." Id. In Marchica v. Long Island Railroad, the Second Circuit
discussed the requirement of due diligence on the part of a plaintiff, noting,
Where a claim of emotional distress is founded on the fear of developing a disease, the
plaintiff must exercise due diligence to become familiar with the realities of the
disease and defendant should not be liable for emotional distress to the extent the
plaintiff's fear is based on ignorance. Had Marchica educated himself about HIV and
AIDS, defendant insists, he would not have a rational basis for his fear.
Marchica v. Long Island R.R. Co., 31 F.3d 1197, 1205 (2d Cir. 1994).
94. Williamson, 696 A.2d at 21.
95. 666 A.2d 627, 637 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995).
96. De Millo, 666 A.2d at 637.
97. Williamson, 696 A.2d at 23; see also Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., HIV Testing, Coun-
seling, and Prophylaxis After Sexual Assault, 271 JAMA 1436, 1439 (1994) (stating that the vast
majority of individuals infected with HIV have detectable antibodies within three to six months);
Kerins v. Hartley, 27 Cal. App. 4th 1062, 1068 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that HIV testing is
ninety-five percent accurate six months after exposure).
98. Williamson, 696 A.2d at 23.
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the court had determined were the parameters of the "window of anxiety." 99
Thus, the court framed the core liability issue as whether the duration of
Williamson's emotional distress that extended beyond the "window of
anxiety" was attributable to or was proximately caused by the negligence of
Doctors Waldman, Feldman, and Losman.OO In essence, the New Jersey
Supreme Court had to determine whether the "additional" emotional
distress, clearly outside the "window of anxiety," should be attributed to the
original defendants or if the erroneous medical advice constituted an inter-
vening cause 01 that was not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the
defendant's original negligence.1 02 Since the question of a legal duty is or-
dinarily one for the court to determine as a matter of law, the New Jersey
Supreme Court was required to determine the extent to which the "bad"
(negligent) medical advice can be recognized as a part of the original de-
fendants' duty of due care, the breach of which constituted a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's emotional distress as a matter of law. 103
Historically, New Jersey courts had adopted the traditional viewpoint
that the initial tortfeasors (Doctors Waldman, Feldman, and Losman) are
liable for the results of the medical treatment of an injured victim. 104 In
Knutsen v. Brown,105 the Appellate Division stated that where a person
suffers personal injury as a result of another's negligence, the tortfeasor is
liable for any additional harm and expense caused to the injured person by
virtue of that negligence, mistake, or lack of skill of the attending physician
or surgeon. 106 Would the New Jersey Supreme Court apply these tradi-
tional rules to Williamson in light of its stated policy concerns regarding
ignorance about HIV and AIDS?
The court answered the question in the negative and concluded that the
defendant doctors should not be held responsible for the subsequent incor-
rect advice that was not within the "generally accepted medical evidence"
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. An intervening cause is an independent, generally non-foreseeable act, "which inter-
venes between the original wrongful act or omission and the injury, turns aside the natural se-
quence of events, and produces a result which would not otherwise have followed and which
could not have been reasonably anticipated." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 956 (4th ed. 1951).
102. Williamson, 696 A.2d at 23.
103. Id. at 24. "The overriding principle governing the determination of a duty is the general
obligation to avoid foreseeable harm to others." Carvalho v. Toll Bros. & Developers, 675 A.2d
209, 212 (N.J. 1996).
104. See Ciluffo v. Middlesex General Hosp., 370 A.2d 57, 63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1977) (holding that an initial tortfeasor is potentially liable for all natural and proximate injuries
that flow from the initial tort, including the consequences of medical treatment).
105. 232 A.2d 833 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967). See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 14, § 44, at 308.
106. Knutsen, 232 A.2d at 836.
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regarding the effectiveness of HIV testing.l07 The arguably erroneous
("bad") advice of Dr. DeMasi was not deemed reasonably foreseeable by
the defendant doctors as a matter of law.108 The court reasoned that the
adoption of the "enhanced reasonableness standard" would be inconsistent
with imputing to the original tortfeasors the plaintiff's fear that she had
contracted AIDS, which was subsequently prolonged and exacerbated by
incorrect information from a medical professional. 109 The court analogized
its holding to the "learned intermediary" rule of products liability under
which a manufacturer of a drug would ordinarily discharge its duty to warn
the ultimate user of a prescription drug by supplying the physician with the
required information concerning the drug's dangerous propensities.110 It is
then expected that the physician, the intermediary between the drug manu-
facturer and the patient, will provide the correct medical advice and the
proper warnings. 111
The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the information
allegedly provided by Dr. DeMasi-that the plaintiff needed to be tested for
the presence of HIV for a period of seven to ten years-was "beyond the
pale of generally accepted medical evidence regarding HIV testing and
ought not, as a matter of law, be deemed to be reasonably foreseeable by
other health care professionals.""l 2 Consequently, Williamson's damages,
based on the infliction of emotional distress arising from her fear of con-
tracting AIDS, determined under a standard of "enhanced reasonableness"
does not include that emotional distress that is attributable to the conduct of
107. Williamson, 696 A.2d at 24.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. See also Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1096 (1974) (holding "[wihere prescription drugs are concerned, the manufacturer's duty
to warn is limited to an obligation to advise the prescribing physician of any potential dangers that
may result from the drug's use"). This standard for prescription drugs is an exception to the
Restatement's general rule that one who markets goods must warn foreseeable ultimate users of
dangers inherent in his products. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965). The doctrine
does not generally apply to non-prescription drugs; in sales of non-prescription drugs, the
manufacturer must warn the consumer directly. Torsiello v. Whitehall Labs., Div. of Home Prods.
Corp., 398 A.2d 137, 137-38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), cert. denied, 404 A.2d 1150
(1979). There are, however, numerous exceptions to the general rule involving mass immuni-
zation programs or where drugs are dispensed in a public health clinic. See, e.g., Davis v. Wyeth
Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding that warnings be given directly to the
consumer for polio vaccine distributed in a mass immunization program in which the drug
manufacturer participated, because the drug was dispensed "to all comers at mass clinics without
any individualized balancing by a physician of the risks involved"); Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1294-95
(holding that the learned intermediary exception did not apply because the manufacturer could
foresee that the vaccine would be routinely administered in this fashion at a public health clinic).
111. Niemiera v. Schneider, 55 A.2d 1112, 1117 (N.J. 1989).
112. Williamson, 696 A.2d at 24.
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Dr. DeMasi.l13 How would the court's opinion in Williamson impact John
Doe in his suit against Dr. Paul Arts?
V. DOE V. ARTS REDUX
As outlined earlier, the plaintiff John Doe filed an action against Dr.
Paul Arts and the Raritan Bay Medical Center alleging that, in 1991, he was
incorrectly and negligently informed by Dr. Arts that he was HIV-positive
when in fact he was not.114 The complaint also alleged that his case had
been subsequently mishandled by other parties.ll 5 The plaintiff claimed
negligence on the part of Dr. Arts, alleging that he had deviated from ac-
cepted standards of medical care, had failed to properly read the tests
results, had misinformed Doe of the results, and had failed to retest him.116
As a result of the negligence of Dr. Arts and the subsequent conduct of
other defendants, the plaintiff alleged that he had become depressed and had
suffered from physical and psychological injuries, including a variant of
post-traumatic stress disorder. 17
The jury found that Dr. Arts had in fact "deviated from generally
accepted standards of [medical] practice in his care and treatment of the
plaintiff' and that this deviation was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's
damages."i8 During the trial, Dr. Joseph Cervia testified as an expert for the
plaintiff, opining that it was improper and a breach of the standard of care
to give test results over the phone because the test results could be easily
misinterpreted. 1 9 Dr. Cervia also stated that Dr. Arts had failed to provide
the plaintiff with pre or post-testing counseling.120 The failure to give prop-
er post-testing counseling was a proximate cause of plaintiff's "continuing"
treatment at both Robert Wood Johnson and Raritan Bay and of his belief
that he was HIV-positive for a three year period.12' A second expert, Dr.
Susan Cutchall, testified "within a reasonable degree of medical certainty"
that Dr. Arts had "deviate[d] from the standard of care for obtaining [a]
blood sample" from the plaintiff, had conveyed incorrect information
113. Id.





119. Id. at 860.
120. Id. at 860-61. The record had indicated that Dr. Arts had seen the plaintiff for a total of
thirty to sixty seconds before administering the test and did not counsel the plaintiff before the
blood was drawn. Id. at 859.
121. Id. at 860-61.
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concerning the nature of test results, and had incorrectly advised the
plaintiff that he was HIV-positive. 122
After the verdict had been entered, Dr. Arts filed an appeal, contending
that the trial judge had "plainly erred by instructing the jurors that if they
found Dr. Arts negligent[,] he was responsible for all subsequent damages,"
which was in violation of the principles previously enunciated in
Williamson v. Waldman123 The Appellate Division disagreed and held that
Williamson was inapplicable in this case. 124 The court concluded that Doe
was easily distinguishable from Williamson on a factual basis.125 The court
stated unequivocally, "[tihis is not a 'fear of AIDS' case because it does not
involve the emotional reaction to plaintiff's possible exposure to body
fluids carrying HIV."126 Rather, this was a traditional negligence or medi-
cal malpractice case involving the misreading of test results and the
rendering of a negligent diagnosis.127 In Doe, the plaintiff was actually told
by the testing physician that he had HIV, a fact giving rise to emotional
distress 128 beyond the fear of contracting AIDS.129
The Appellate Division focused on the instructions of the trial court to
the jury, where the trial court judge had instructed jurors that if they found
Dr. Arts negligent he would be responsible for "all subsequent damages."130
Damages would not be limited by any "window of anxiety" consider-
ations. 131 The Appellate Division pointedly noted, "[i]f Dr. Arts is negli-
gent, and that negligence was a proximate cause of injuries and damages to
plaintiff, Dr. Arts is responsible for all damages that flow from it .... He
can't hide behind the wrong-doing or alleged wrong doing of somebody
else or somebody [who] wasn't a party to that."132
The trial court had framed the issue of damages by noting that the
plaintiff would be entitled to recover the fair and reasonable monetary
122. Id. at 861.
123. Id. at 863. (emphasis added).




128. See id (citing Schulman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 226 A.D.2d 164, 164 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1996); Harvey v. Cramer, 235 A.D.2d 315, 316 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Baker v. Dorfman,
239 F.3d 415, 421 (2d Cir. 2000); Poveromo-Spring v. Exxon Corp., 968 F. Supp. 219, 228
(D.N.J. 1997)).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 863-64. It is well settled in the law of torts that a "tortfeasor is liable for the
natural and probable consequences of the tortuous act." Holdsworth v. Galler, 785 A.2d 25, 31
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
131. Doe v. Arts, 823 A.2d 855, 863-64 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
132. Id. at 866 n.6.
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damages for the full extent of the harm caused, 133 including any disability,
impairment, loss of enjoyment of life, and pain and suffering ". . . [from]
the time of the incident up to the present time and even into the future if
you find it has continued to the present or it can reasonably be [expected] to
continue into the future."' 34 Dr. Michael Spodak, an expert in general and
forensic psychiatry, had diagnosed the plaintiff with various problems,
including "post traumatic stress" disorder, major depression, severe insom-
nia, and the loss of his sex drive.135 Dr. Spodak classified plaintiff's
condition as "permanent."1 36 Since the jury had specifically found that
Raritan Bay Medical Center was not negligent, and since Dr. Arts had not
sought any determination that Robert Wood Johnson was negligent, the
Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the trial court and confirmed
the award of $300,000 to Doe for his damages. 1
37
VI. CONCLUSION
At the end of 2003, an estimated 40 million people worldwide were
living with HIV/AIDS: 37 million adults and 2.5 million children younger
than 15 years of age.138 Approximately two-thirds of these individuals live
in Sub-Saharan Africa and another 18 percent or 7.4 million live in Asia
and the Pacific.139 An estimated 5 million new HIV infections occurred
worldwide during 2003.140 More than 95 percent of these new infections
occurred in developing countries, and nearly 50 percent were among
females.141 In 2002 alone, HIV/AIDS-associated illnesses caused the
133. Id. at 857. The trial judge also asked the jury whether the "defendants proved by a
preponderance of the credible evidence that plaintiff ... failed to bring his HIV test results to
Robert Wood Johnson Medical Center" and, if so, the "percentage of [plaintiff's] damages...
proximately caused by this failure." Id. at 857 n.2. This question related to the issue of "dimi-
nution or mitigation of damages," and not to any question of "comparative fault." Id. The jury
answered this specific question in the negative. Id.
134. Id. at 867.
135. Id. at 860. New Jersey courts have determined that post-traumatic stress damages,
which have been quite controversial, can amount to permanent psychological harm. See Collins v.
Union County Jail, 696 A.2d 625, 632-33 (1997) (holding that plaintiff's claim for psychological
harm in the form of post-traumatic stress disorder resulting from the rape by a corrections officer
constitute a "permanent loss of a bodily function" within the meaning of New Jersey's Tort Claim
Act).
136. Doe, 823 A.2d at 860.
137. Id. at 867.
138. Nat'l Inst. on Allergy & Infectious Disease, NIH, Clinical Studies: AIDS Information,
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deaths of approximately 3 million people worldwide, including an
estimated 500,000 children younger than 15 years of age.142
The CDC estimates that 850,000 to 950,000 Americans are currently
HIV-positive, one-quarter of whom are unaware of their infection.143 It is
estimated that over 380,000 people are living with AIDS, with about 40,000
new infections occurring each year.'4 Because these numbers and because
modern drugs, called protease inhibitors, have transformed AIDS from a
veritable death sentence to a chronic, manageable illness,145 the legal en-
vironment surrounding HIV and AIDS is still developing.146
In terms of HIV testing, 45.6 percent of all persons nationally in the
age group 18-64 have received an HIV test. 147 In New Jersey, this figure
stands at 47.7 percent.148 Thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia
offer anonymous testing in addition to confidential testing.149 Eleven states
offer confidential testing only. 50 Thirty-five states have name-based re-
porting; eight states and the District of Columbia have code-based re-
porting; and five states have name-to-code-based reporting.'51 New Jersey
offers anonymous, confidential, and name-based testing.152
Each year, approximately 66,000 to 70,000 HIV tests are done in the
State of New Jersey in more than 300 sites located throughout the state,
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. Concerning new infections among men in the United States, the CDC estimates that
approximately 60% of men were infected through homosexual sex, 25% through injection drug
use, and 15% through heterosexual sex. Id. Of newly infected men, approximately 50% are
black, 30% are white, 20% are Hispanic, and a small percentage are members of other racial or
ethnic groups. Id. See also generally, CDC, HIV PREVENTION STRATEGIC PLAN THROUGH 2005
(Jan. 2001).
145. Protease inhibitors were first discovered by Dr. David Ho. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Turn-
ing the Tide, TIME, Dec. 30, 1996, available at http://www.time.com/special/moy/ho/intro-
text l.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2003). For information about how protease inhibitors work and
their considerable benefits to AIDS patients, see What the Heck Does Protease Inhibitor Have To
Do With HIV, at http://people.ku.edu/jbrown/protease.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2003).
146. But see Santee, supra note 81, at 210 n.89 (noting "[elven though 'drug cocktails' have
prolonged victims' lives longer than ever before, the doses are physically difficult to ingest and
the regimen is difficult to follow. Drug cocktails represent the regimen of drugs HIV-positive
persons take to slow the development of HIV to AIDS."); see also DARRELL E. WARD, THE
AMFAR AIDS HANDBOOK 68-103 (1999) (describing AIDS drug therapy).
147. See Kaiser Family Found., State Health Facts Online, at http://www.statehealthfacts.
kff.org (last visited Feb. 14, 2004) for a site providing electronic links leading to detailed
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mainly at publicly funded HIV counseling and testing centers. 153 Clients
identified through this system of publicly funded HIV counseling and
testing activities account for approximately 25 percent of all reported HIV
cases in a year.-54 32,401 people are currently reported living with HIV or
AIDS in New Jersey, with minorities accounting for 78 percent of
HIV/AIDS cases. 155
As a result of the incidences of HIV/AIDS, New Jersey has been a
leader in creating a substantive body of law in these areas. First, in
Williamson v. Waldman, the New Jersey Supreme Court established that a
plaintiff could not recover damages for emotional distress because her fears
were not reasonable.156 In so deciding, the court set out a "foreseeable risk
standard" and adopted an "enhanced reasonableness standard" in which the
plaintiff's damages must be based on the fears of a reasonable and well-
informed person and must be limited to a "window of anxiety" after which
such a reasonable and well-informed person would no longer experience
continuing emotional distress.157 Later, in Doe v. Arts, the New Jersey Ap-
pellate Division refused to apply Williamson to a case which was not a "fear
of AIDS" case; rather, the Appellate Division characterized Doe as a
traditional medical malpractice-negligence case in which the plaintiff was
told that he had tested positive and spent the next three years actually
believing that diagnosis.158 Thus, because Doe experienced severe emo-
tional distress after learning he was not HIV-positive, the jury could
consider damages for that emotional distress as well.159 The establishment
of the "enhanced reasonableness" standard by New Jersey courts and the
ability of courts to distinguish between a "fear of AIDS" and a traditional
medical malpractice case indicate that New Jersey is interested primarily in
promoting public education, calming any irrational fears that accompany
the AIDS virus, and fighting the prejudice, ignorance, and discrimination
that surrounds the issue in order to deal effectively with the continuing
crisis.
153. NEW JERSEY DEPT. OF HEALTH & SENIOR SERVS., NEW JERSEY HIV/AIDS REPORT 19
(June 30, 2004, at http://www.state.nj.us/health/aids/qtrO4O6.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2005). It is
interesting to note that of the 66,041 tests conducted in New Jersey in 2003, 1,120 individuals, or
1.7 percent, tested positively. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See supra Part IV.B.
157. Id.
158. See supra Part V.
159. Id.
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